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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
A. NORMAN GROVER; ARTHUR N.
GROVER; ESTELLA V. GROVER;
FLOYD E. GROVER; FAY G. WIGHT;
AMY G. JENSEN; MAX L. GROVER;
JESSE G. PARRY; JOYCE ANNA G.
SMITH and JUNE G. HUFFMAN,
P"laintiff s and Appellants,

vs.

Civil No.
10038

OLEEN GARN and MAXINE B. GARN,
his wife; DARVEL GARN and BONNIE
L. GARN, his wife; CLIVE GARN and
ALOHA GARN, his wife; and ARTHUR
N. GROVER FARMS, INC., a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

ARTHUR N. GROVER FARMS, INC., a
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
OLEEN GARN and MAXINE B. GARN,
his wife; DARVEL GARN and BONNIE
L. GARN, his wife; and CLIVE GARN
and ALOHA GARN, his wife,

Civil No.
10081

Defendants and Respondents.

APP'ELLANTS' REP'L Y BRIEF
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
Re::;pondents state that the,y do not agree with appellants' ::;tatement of facts. Significantly, they do not
controvert appellants' statement. They merely make their
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own statement of facts which consists entirely of a digest
of parts of the testimony of witnesses, a restatement of
the findings of fact and conclusions of law and some exaggerated comments and erroneous conclusions of respondents' counsel, in all covering sixteen printed pages.
Since appellants' statement is not controverted either
expressly or by pointing out wherein it is inconsistent
with the facts, nothing remains except for the Court to
determine the law applicable to these facts.
RESPONDENTS' POINTS OF LAW
Respondents have combined three distinct propositions into one conglomerate, making it extremely difficult to understand their argument. They do not, however,
contest the fact that the contract of sale covered substantially all of the corporate assets and that the enforcement thereof would, in effect, put an end to the life of
the coq)oration.
A faint attempt is made to uphold the sale upon the
ground that it was made in the usual course of business.
This attempt is predicated upon a provision in the Articles of Incorporation empowering the company to buy
and sell real estate. This argument fails to distinguish
between the powers and the business of the corporation.
The statute (Section 16-10-4) confers upon all corporations for profit the power to buy and sell real estate, and
a provision in the Articles conferring such power is
superfluous. The business of Arthur N. Grover Farms,
Inc. and the pnrvose for which it was organized "Was to
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01wrate the farm lands involved m this action. The
u::-;ual course of its business was farming and the sale
of these farm lands would completely frustrate the
business of the corporation.
The admitted fact that the contract covered substantially all assets of the corporation and the undis1mkd fact that the sale ·was not made in the usual course
of business of the corporation brings this case squarely
under the operation of Section 16-10-74, U.C.A. 1953,
1\'l1ich is in substance a codification of common law.
Respondents cannot cope with the finding of the
trial court that none of the provisions of this section
wvrc complied with. Since this finding pulls the rug out
from under respondents' feet, they are compelled to rest
their case upon the fiction that the corporation and Mr.
and Mrs. Grover are a single, legal entity. The contention
seems to be that some sort of estoppel arises out of this
fiction.
To characterize the individuals and the corporation
as a single entity is a perversion of the undisputed facts.
Arthur N. Grover Farms, Inc. is a valid corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah.
Its corporate powers are vested in a board of directors.
I ts officers and directors are duly qualified to act as
:-;1,ch. It is the absolute owner of both legal and equitable
title to the farm lands in question. It has been since its
organization, actively engaged in operating this farm.
Contrary to respondents' unsupported assertions to the
eontrary the shareholders of the corporation are Mr. and
j[ rs. Grover and their children.

4

The contract of sale purports to be the contract of
the corporation executed by the vice president. It is not
the contract of Mr. or Mrs. Grover either in form or
reality.
Respondents do not contend that Arthur N. Grover
Farms, Inc. is not a valid and subsisting Utah corporation
or that it did not hold both legal and equitable title to
the property or that it had not, since its organization
actively managed, controlled and operated this very substantial farm project. Neither do they deny that the corporation is the seller of the property and executed the
contract of sale. The contention appears to be that the
corporation is "a family corporation" and therefore not
governed by the same law that applies to "a public corporation." This rather startling proposition is not supported by any authority and it manifestly is without any
foundation.
In our opening brief we demonstrated, by the decisions of several courts including our own Supreme
Court that the corporate veil cannot be pierced in orde,r
to giye vitality to a totally unauthorized corporate contract of sale, and that the only justification for ignoring
the corporate entity is to prevent the perpetration of a
fraud. The cases cited by respondents recognize this
limited application of the doctrine and are in accord ·with
the Utah law.
In the present case the only fraud to be circumvented
is the constructive fraud of the respondents in taking an
undue ad\'antage of an aged and infirm couple hy strip-
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ping them of their lifetime accumulations for an unconscionable consideration. We pointed out in our opening
brief that if the contract of sale is upheld, the respondents
will be able to acquire this large farming project without
the investment of any of their own funds, and that the
tax impaet upon the transaction is disastrous.
There is not a scintilla of evidence to support respondents' theory of estoppel. They were fully informed
with respect to the corporate status of Arthur N. Grover
Farms, Inc. and its ownership of the property involved.
They knew who the directors and officers of the corporation were and that there had been no meeting either of
directors or shareholders and no approval of the transaction except by Arthur N. Grover. They had no prior
dealings either with the corporation or with the Grovers.
They were not misled and no misrepresentation whrut~
ever was made to them or any of them. The only business
in which the corporation was engaged was farming and
the sale of farm products. It had never sold any real
estate either on its own account or for others.
Respondents say that Section 16-10-74 is really controlled by Section 16-10-6. This is a misconception of the
corporation act.
The two sections cover separate and distinct subject
matters. The latter deals with corporate powers while
the former deals ·with the procedure that must be followed
in order to make a valid sale of all of the assets of the
eompany.
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Plaintiffs have not attacked the sale upon the ground
that it is ultra vires. 1'he issues are whether the sale
was authorized by the directors and approved by the
shareholders, and whether the vice president had authority to bind the corporation.
The cases cited by respondents in which they claim
that a valid sale of all the assets of the corporation can
be made without complying ·with any of the requirements
of Section 16-10-74, are readily distinguishable. Only two
of them deal with a statute similar to ours. In Lange vs.
Resen;ation Mining Cornpany, the saJe was authorized
by the board of trustees and was submitted for approval
at a special meeting of the stockholders called for that
purpose. Two thirds of the stock voted to approve the
sale. Unlike the present situation, the sale did not thwart
the purposes for which the corporation was organized
nor did it destroy the corporation itself. The Court said:
"But in the case before us, the sale does not
disrupt the corporation, nor is it contrary to the
purposes for which the corporation was formed.
On the contrary, the corporation ·will be in as good
a condition to proceed with the objects it was
formed to promote after this sale as it was before,
and the sale will be but fulfilling one of its objects
and purposes."

In Painter v.-.:. Bra11ard, etc., 163 NJ~., six of the
sPven directors authorized the sale at a formal meeting.
The nweting was not regularly called but it was held and
tlw sale ·was approYed by the directors as a unit. Furtlwrrnore, it did not clis1iose of all of the assets of tlw r<H'vora.tion.
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It is not necessary to distinguish any of the remainmg cases cited by respondents in support of their contention that the appellants are estopped to question the
sale upon the theory that the corporation was the alterego of Mr. and Mrs. Grover. All of these cases recognize
the proposition that the corporate entity cannot be disregarded except to prevent fraud or wrong doing. Respondents are unable to ref er us to even a scintilla of
evidence of any fraud or wrong doing on the part of
either Mr. or Mrs. Grover. If there is any inequitable
conduct involved in this transaction it is that of respondents in overreaching and taking advantage of a mentally
disturbed old man who obviously was incapable of comprehending the nature or consequences of the transaction.

It is likewise unnecessary to distinguish any of the
cases cited by respondents to support their theory that
the mandate of Section 16-10-74 may not be invoked by
a1Jpellants because of the stock ownership of Mr. and
~lrs. Grover who attested and signed the contract. It is
not trne that they owned all of the stock in the corporation. At the time the sale was made the children were
(•quitable mvners of a substantial amount of the stock.
\Ve vointed out in our opening brief that it was not of
vontrolling importance "\Yhether the certificates had been
dPlin'red or not.
There is no escape from the conclusion that compliance with the statute is a condition precedent to the
\'alidity of the sale involved in this action. The powers
ol' a corporation are ypsted solely in the hoard of directors. All authority to bind the corporation must eminate
from tlH· hoard.
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In the case of a sale of all or substantially all of the
assets of the company the directors must act as a unit.
'l'lwy cannot legally act separately or consecutively. They
must hold a meeting so that the advisability or propriety
of the transaction can be debated and a composite. conclusion reached. Furthermore, they must reduce their
judgment to writing in order that the stockholders will
have written evidence of the board's action. This a0tion
of the board must be approved by the stockholders at a
meeting called for the express purpose of approving or
rejecting the action of the board. Without a written resolution of the board of directors authorizing the sale, there
is nothing for the stockholders to either approve or disapprove. It is futile to contend that a single director can
in df0ct terrninah~ the life of a corporation by disposing
of all of its assets without even consulting the other directors.
All of the negotiations leading up to the sale in this
case were conducted by Arthur N. Grover. He did not
even execute the contract on behalf of the corporation.
He merely atksted the execution by the vice-president,
who acted solely under the undue influence of her husband.

THE GROVERS ARE NOT
INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE
The judgment of the trial court imposing a personal liability upon the Gro\'ers under the contract for
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$5,000, attorney's fee and $525, the value of grazing
rights that the corporation did not own is completely indefensible upon any plausible theory. Re,spondents do
not intimate that the Grovers actually or impliedly represented or warranted that they had authority to dispose
of the corporation's assets and put it out of business.
Respondents were fully informed of the fact that the
farm lands were mvned by the corporation. They knew
that the sale was not authorized, by the board of directors. They knew or had the means of knowing that Mrs.
Grover had no authority whatever to execute the contract on behalf of the corporation. No information was
withheld and no misrepresentation was ever made by
either of the Grovers with respect to any matter pertinent
to the transaction.
A mere glance at the document will disclose that it
is not executed or signed by the Grovers as individuals.
They were expressly designated as vice president and
:-H·cretary respectively. 'rhere is not a word in the contract to indicate that either of them is a party to it. To
hold that the contract is the contract of the individuals
~n1d the corporation is in the teeth of the uncontrovertahle facts. It is pre11ostrrous to contend that the contract
mnst lw held to be the contract of Mr. and Mrs. Grover
in ordt'l' to prevt'nt the pt:>rpetration of a fraud upon the
respondents. Admittedly a wrong has been done, but the
\':et;m:o. are the appellants and not the respondPnts.
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CONCLUSION
Hesvondenb have not controverted the facts that
the sale of the farm land to respondents covered substantially all of the assets of the corporation and that the
sall' was not made in the usnal course of business. They
do not question the finding of the trial court that none of
tlw requirements of Section 16-10-74 U.C.A. 1953 were
complied with or that either of the Grovers had any actual authority to bind the coqwration by the contract of
sale. Their contention that the Grovers and the corporation must be regarded as a single legal entity in order
to prevent the perpetration of a fraud upon them is without any merit, and the authorities upon which they rely
negate rather than support their contentions. RespondPnts liave no answer to our argument that the Grovers
cannot he held individually liable nnder the contra0t
upon any theory of breach of warranty. They rest their
case upon the false proposition that the Grovers and the
corporation are one and the same legal entity. They have
failed to furnish an~Y sound support for the judgment of
th<> trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
YAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNvV ALL & McCARTHY
Clifford L. Ashton
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants

141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

